"Contagion" is the new key word in markets. And risk aversion is a natural consequence. Hence the flight to the US Dollar, and Gold
The Europeans are struggling to keep their act (and their currency) together, even as Ireland stutters through the economics and politics of trying to get a basic bank rescue fund in place, and the IMF (as well as the rating agencies) even marginally satisfied. Irish, Portugese, Spanish, and Greek bonds are trading at life-time high yields. Markets are quick to focus on Spain (and the other peripheral European dalliance partners) even if they scent an Ireland rescue coming together (if the Irish Government that negotiated this rescue even lasts to be able to see it through!). Meanwhile, in a finalist slot for understatement of the year, the Irish central bank governor Honohan says that “confidence in the banks and government is well below what is justified”.
Germany’s Merkel says the Euro is in an "exceptionally serious situation, there is no alternative to German budget austerity"; she sees at best 'decent' German GDP growth soon. Merkelisms otherwise focus on the post-2013 Euro rescue system (while markets worry about how we will even get there in one piece) as she pontificates that it “must involve investors but politicians need 'primacy' over markets”. German Finance Minister Schaeuble weighs in with “Germany is not swimming in money but drowning in debt; the future of the joint currency is at stake”. Even as I write this, that currency (the Euro) is as close to bid-less today as it can possibly get.
Otherwise, things are okay. To paraphrase various literary pieces today "The Koreans are back in ‘explosive mode” throwing loud things around, the FBI is serving hot warrants around the Street, and everywhere you look you see a sea of joblessness, a housing market that remains very soft, absolute records in deficits, two open-ended wars that have got off the front pages for a bit, an im/exploding mortgage-backed securitization problem of gargantuan intensity, the Federal Reserve continuing to print money as its predominant tool of considered monetary policy, many US States and municipalities in doomsday-level financial peril...."
Not much fun out there folks, even as we head to a Thanksgiving break. If anything the Thanks may just be due for the break !
Jaidev
Tuesday, November 23, 2010
Saturday, November 20, 2010
QEII
Aditya Rana writes....
Criticisms of QE2 have centered around its inability to increase growth and reduce unemployment while stoking inflationary pressures in the economy through an increase in money supply. As pointed out in last week’s newsletter, the impact of quantitative easing on the economy is likely to be muted while its impact on increasing asset prices can be significant. However, it is unlikely to have any impact on inflation in the developed world due to prevailing excess capacity and lack of credit growth. But, most importantly, it does have a significant impact on increasing asset prices and inflation in emerging markets as argued by two star managers at the well known hedge GLG in the FT last week.
Read more on the Aditya Rana page in this Blog Post......
Jaidev
Criticisms of QE2 have centered around its inability to increase growth and reduce unemployment while stoking inflationary pressures in the economy through an increase in money supply. As pointed out in last week’s newsletter, the impact of quantitative easing on the economy is likely to be muted while its impact on increasing asset prices can be significant. However, it is unlikely to have any impact on inflation in the developed world due to prevailing excess capacity and lack of credit growth. But, most importantly, it does have a significant impact on increasing asset prices and inflation in emerging markets as argued by two star managers at the well known hedge GLG in the FT last week.
Read more on the Aditya Rana page in this Blog Post......
Jaidev
Monday, November 15, 2010
Risk Appetite ....is back, at least in the soul-search!
There is new market-wide focus on the creation, adoption and implementation of appropriate Risk Appetite statements for financial firms. The key challenges in this include but are not restricted to: How to define it (top-down, generically and at level of portfolio/marginal risk), How to dimension and communicate it, How to monitor it (reporting issues, common metrics, creation and artistry of a “risk dashboard”), How to test it (potential loss and limits architecture and monitoring, scenario analysis including non-quantitative “what-if” tests), How to reconcile business strategy with it (including acquisitions and divestitures) and not least How to align incentives with it (compensation issues).
Many companies are currently working on detailed statements of Risk Appetite. Boards have begun to insist that they see one and actively discuss the same with the CEO, CFO and CRO. The process includes Dimensioning Risk Appetite, formulating a Statement/s of Risk Appetite, Communicating this all the way along and down the organization.
Risk Appetite dimensions of a firm typically should include a Quantitative and a Qualitative component/s. Quantitative Risk Appetite is articulated at the level of the firm overall, and usually also at one or more subsidiary levels such as key businesses, regions, products, and risk-types as well. Dimensions include
- Economic and Regulatory Risk Capital
- Value-at-Risk, Earnings at Risk, and the requirement that these be related to both the Risk Appetite overall and to the subsidiary structure of product and risk level Limits
- Scenario Analysis & Stress-Testing Results at portfolio and transactional levels.
Some leading banks have operational-ized the Risk Appetite statement - at a portfolio/transaction level, risk-takers and risk-managers must justify, approve, monitor, and report on Stress Returns, and Returns on Capital i.e. RAROC, RORAC, RORC, NIACC etc..
Qualitative Risk Appetite includes some range of acceptable risks and boundaries across
- Businesses that the firm will do and How
- Unusual, Unintended, and Unacceptable risks
- Approach to Legal and Regulatory grey areas
- Ethics and Conflict of Interest Policies/statements
- Loud clarity on unacceptable behavior (articulating policies on, say, sexual harassment and discrimination are relatively easy as they belong in the zero-tolerance zone. Firms seem to find things so-very-difficult once you go beyond these simple examples)
Will be back with more on this as also on Risk Principles, Policies, processes....
Jaidev
Many companies are currently working on detailed statements of Risk Appetite. Boards have begun to insist that they see one and actively discuss the same with the CEO, CFO and CRO. The process includes Dimensioning Risk Appetite, formulating a Statement/s of Risk Appetite, Communicating this all the way along and down the organization.
Risk Appetite dimensions of a firm typically should include a Quantitative and a Qualitative component/s. Quantitative Risk Appetite is articulated at the level of the firm overall, and usually also at one or more subsidiary levels such as key businesses, regions, products, and risk-types as well. Dimensions include
- Economic and Regulatory Risk Capital
- Value-at-Risk, Earnings at Risk, and the requirement that these be related to both the Risk Appetite overall and to the subsidiary structure of product and risk level Limits
- Scenario Analysis & Stress-Testing Results at portfolio and transactional levels.
Some leading banks have operational-ized the Risk Appetite statement - at a portfolio/transaction level, risk-takers and risk-managers must justify, approve, monitor, and report on Stress Returns, and Returns on Capital i.e. RAROC, RORAC, RORC, NIACC etc..
Qualitative Risk Appetite includes some range of acceptable risks and boundaries across
- Businesses that the firm will do and How
- Unusual, Unintended, and Unacceptable risks
- Approach to Legal and Regulatory grey areas
- Ethics and Conflict of Interest Policies/statements
- Loud clarity on unacceptable behavior (articulating policies on, say, sexual harassment and discrimination are relatively easy as they belong in the zero-tolerance zone. Firms seem to find things so-very-difficult once you go beyond these simple examples)
Will be back with more on this as also on Risk Principles, Policies, processes....
Jaidev
Wednesday, October 27, 2010
Run Turkey Run...Gross !
Whether you have or have not read or heard Bill Gross before, here is a great one ... I offer this humbly, and as a great admirer of Gross, but of course not to endorse the explicit PIMCO ad here....!
http://www.pimco.com/Pages/RunTurkeyRun.aspx
http://www.pimco.com/Pages/RunTurkeyRun.aspx
Tuesday, October 5, 2010
Risk Conferences flourish, and a rogue trader does not
Back after a week in San Francisco, and two excellent conferences ….. Moody’s Risk Practitioners Conference, and CFA Institute’s GIPS Conference
I am impressed and delighted by the extent of participation in each of these conferences – would have definitely called the size of the turnout ‘surprising’ given suggestions that companies and people have become very leery and tight-fisted about the money and the time spent out at these market conferences. On the other hand, maybe this was not so surprising given the quality of the organizations behind these events, and the outstanding value provided by the content, presenters, et al.
I spoke at both these conferences, as always shaking my finger at the excesses and the indolence that led to the current crisis, and pleading for lessons to be extracted, learnt, and used going forward. Questions that came at me included ones on Stress-Testing, VaR, quantitative focus in Risk, risk training, Basel 4,5 & 6…..
My big agenda is still People Risk – about the fear and greed that drives risk, (notwithstanding as someone said that to blame greed for the market is like blaming gravity for a plane crash), about how especially in a crisis markets are not efficient and players are not rational, and people don’t behave the same way when they are alone versus in a crowd, or when they are making money versus when they are losing much. And if people are really our greatest assets, like every major corporation on earth will eagerly tell you, then are we really treating and safeguarding them like that were so? As I drove out this morning, I heard that a French court has convicted Jerome Kerviel of Societe Generale in what is the most famous recent case of rogue trading (Bernie Madoff apart). This is a story of a small-time-trader on an arbitrage deck breaking over 140 key controls to build up exposures exceeding $ 70 billion, managing finally to lose over $ 7 billion. The sentence includes 3 years in general, and a promise from Jerome to repay all the money – all 7 billion of it! Good luck with that!!
I am impressed and delighted by the extent of participation in each of these conferences – would have definitely called the size of the turnout ‘surprising’ given suggestions that companies and people have become very leery and tight-fisted about the money and the time spent out at these market conferences. On the other hand, maybe this was not so surprising given the quality of the organizations behind these events, and the outstanding value provided by the content, presenters, et al.
I spoke at both these conferences, as always shaking my finger at the excesses and the indolence that led to the current crisis, and pleading for lessons to be extracted, learnt, and used going forward. Questions that came at me included ones on Stress-Testing, VaR, quantitative focus in Risk, risk training, Basel 4,5 & 6…..
My big agenda is still People Risk – about the fear and greed that drives risk, (notwithstanding as someone said that to blame greed for the market is like blaming gravity for a plane crash), about how especially in a crisis markets are not efficient and players are not rational, and people don’t behave the same way when they are alone versus in a crowd, or when they are making money versus when they are losing much. And if people are really our greatest assets, like every major corporation on earth will eagerly tell you, then are we really treating and safeguarding them like that were so? As I drove out this morning, I heard that a French court has convicted Jerome Kerviel of Societe Generale in what is the most famous recent case of rogue trading (Bernie Madoff apart). This is a story of a small-time-trader on an arbitrage deck breaking over 140 key controls to build up exposures exceeding $ 70 billion, managing finally to lose over $ 7 billion. The sentence includes 3 years in general, and a promise from Jerome to repay all the money – all 7 billion of it! Good luck with that!!
Monday, September 13, 2010
Basel III - Capital needed now, but let's take 10 years to get it
In Basel, Switzerland, global regulators agreed on Sunday new rules aimed at strengthening the existing capital requirements for banks.
The minimum common equity requirement will be raised from 2% to 4.5%. Banks will also be required to hold a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% to withstand future periods of stress bringing the total common equity requirements to 7%.
Regulators settled on a long time-line for implementing the new rules, with some of the requirements becoming fully effective only in 2019.
What I find confusing here is the reaction of markets, at least the first time out. There is a big rally in equities around the world. This seems not so much a celebration of new tighter risk rules and requirements, but more a sigh of relief that banks have so long a period of time to comply. Really?! What does that say about our new-found commitment to managing risk. While I can understand shareholders of any individual institution being happy that the firm does not have to run to the markets for fresh capital in a hurry, it seems to me that in the bigger scheme of things such a long period for compliance is a huge market negative. Wouldn’t we rather see our institutions rushing to beef up their capital positions, instead of having the facts tell us they are under-capitalized but can take 8 or 10 years or whatever (regulatory propensity to allow such compliance dates to slide even further is worth another safe bet).
I am not sure this first reaction can, or should, hold. If risk levels require higher capital ratios, let’s go get it now. 10 years is an eternity, and if you are short of capital now, surely you should be extinct by then.
The minimum common equity requirement will be raised from 2% to 4.5%. Banks will also be required to hold a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% to withstand future periods of stress bringing the total common equity requirements to 7%.
Regulators settled on a long time-line for implementing the new rules, with some of the requirements becoming fully effective only in 2019.
What I find confusing here is the reaction of markets, at least the first time out. There is a big rally in equities around the world. This seems not so much a celebration of new tighter risk rules and requirements, but more a sigh of relief that banks have so long a period of time to comply. Really?! What does that say about our new-found commitment to managing risk. While I can understand shareholders of any individual institution being happy that the firm does not have to run to the markets for fresh capital in a hurry, it seems to me that in the bigger scheme of things such a long period for compliance is a huge market negative. Wouldn’t we rather see our institutions rushing to beef up their capital positions, instead of having the facts tell us they are under-capitalized but can take 8 or 10 years or whatever (regulatory propensity to allow such compliance dates to slide even further is worth another safe bet).
I am not sure this first reaction can, or should, hold. If risk levels require higher capital ratios, let’s go get it now. 10 years is an eternity, and if you are short of capital now, surely you should be extinct by then.
Tuesday, September 7, 2010
Back from a break; market risk aversion remains exceptional
Back after a longish break - much has changed, yet in many respects very little has! Risk aversion is at an exceptional high across the board, but the implications of that are still quite unclear in the markets, and there is a huge amount of short-term flows that is contributing volatility and little else. Even as we grasp for any signs of life in the US economy, Europe is back in the spotlight for sovereign woes and banks debt holdings. The spreads between EU sovereigns have moved to levels that are a make-or-break challenge for EU politicians and central banks. Something has to give, probably starting with the currency.
All this in interesting stark contrast to what I saw in India for the past couple of weeks. Booming, construction everywhere, tremendous amount of middle-class consumer activity, and all this despite the horrendous state of domestic politics – very messy and noisy really!
Two big speeches coming up, at Moody’s Risk Practitioners’ Conference September 27 and at the CFA GIPS Conference Sep 29, both in San Francisco, and at venues that are a couple of hundred feet apart! And I am of course still doing my fire-and brimstone-stuff about paying heed to the lessons learned from this crisis, and at least muting the impact of the next one, since surely we will not avoid one altogether.
So, will be back soon, live. Meanwhile, stay at least risk-aware if not risk-averse
All this in interesting stark contrast to what I saw in India for the past couple of weeks. Booming, construction everywhere, tremendous amount of middle-class consumer activity, and all this despite the horrendous state of domestic politics – very messy and noisy really!
Two big speeches coming up, at Moody’s Risk Practitioners’ Conference September 27 and at the CFA GIPS Conference Sep 29, both in San Francisco, and at venues that are a couple of hundred feet apart! And I am of course still doing my fire-and brimstone-stuff about paying heed to the lessons learned from this crisis, and at least muting the impact of the next one, since surely we will not avoid one altogether.
So, will be back soon, live. Meanwhile, stay at least risk-aware if not risk-averse
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